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The Fog of Certainty 
In The Constitutional Power To Interpret International Law, Michael Paulsen 
argues that “[t]he force of international law, as a body of law, upon the United 
States is . . . largely an illusion.”1 Rather than law, international law is “policy 
and politics.”2 For all the certainty with which his argument is advanced, 
however, it cannot survive close scrutiny. At its foundation, Paulsen’s essay 
rests on a pair of fundamental misconceptions of the nature of law. Law is not 
reduced to mere policy, to begin, simply because it can be undone. The sources 
of law, meanwhile, are not singular, but plural. Even were international law not 
domestic law, it would still be law. 
Paulsen insists, to the contrary, that international law is not law, because 
Congress, the President, and the courts can displace it.3 Yet what distinguishes 
binding law from discretionary policy cannot possibly be that it may not be 
undone. Were that true, little if anything would be law. The distinguishing 
characteristic, instead, is that the displacement of law requires some 
substantive standard to be met and some prescribed process followed.4 
Professor Paulsen’s misconception about the sources of law, in turn, arises 
from his unwillingness to analyze international law as anything more than a 
subset of U.S. law. International law may have force—and even be “binding”—
entirely apart from its status as domestic law. This would not be true were the 
Constitution to be understood not simply as failing to give force to 
international law in certain cases, but as affirmatively negating the possibility 
that international law could exert such force. Yet this would imply a further 
misunderstanding—one of the Constitution itself.5 
 
1.  Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power To Interpret International Law, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1762, 1842 (2009). 
2.  Id. 
3.  See id. at 1776-85, 1816-22. 
4.  See infra Part II. 
5.  See infra Part III. 
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These errors, it bears noting, are fairly basic. Before considering them in 
greater detail, therefore, it is worth considering how Professor Paulsen 
manages to go so completely astray. Here, the invocation of Clausewitz’s “fog” 
of war—with its attendant distortions and misperceptions—is perhaps telling.6 
A species of just this may be at work here, with Professor Paulsen misled not by 
the fog of war, but by an exaggerated sense of certainty in the idiosyncratic 
premises with which he begins, and the heterodox conclusions he hopes to 
establish.7 Such certitude is perhaps most visible in the sharply dismissive tone 
of the essay.8 Less apparent—but more consequential—is Professor Paulsen’s 
selective use of authority.9 I begin with a few words on the latter, thus, before 
exploring the twin errors that arise from Paulsen’s exaggerated sense of 
certainty, and which ultimately undermine his claim that “[i]nternational law 
is not, in the main, law for the United States.”10 
i .  the use, non-use, and abuse of authority 
Professor Paulsen’s issues with authority begin with his lack of citation for 
even some of his most striking claims—among them that “none of the branches 
is literally bound by the views or actions of the others”11 and that Congress’s 
power to define “Offences against the Law of Nations”12 is “best understood as 
bounded by the President’s power to command the nation’s military 
 
6.  See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 140 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans., 
Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (1832); see also Alan Beyerchen, Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and 
the Unpredictability of War, INT’L SECURITY, Winter 1992, at 76-77 (reviewing Clausewitz’s 
analysis of the “fog” and “friction” of war); Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1770 (noting 
Clausewitz’s use of the metaphor of “fog” to capture “the inability to think clearly and 
sensibly in the midst of battle”). 
7.  See infra Part I. 
8.  Paulsen describes international law scholars as a “clique” that is “intellectually isolationist 
and parochial,” and prone to “disorganized thinking,” including the view that international 
law trumps U.S. law because the earth is bigger than the United States. See Paulsen, supra 
note 1, at 1764-65, 1824. What might lead international law scholars to such an absurd 
conclusion? They are, Paulsen would seem to believe, too emotional. See id. at 1824. Scare 
quotes are sometimes placed around “International Law” and even the “consular rights” 
mandated by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and scholars of the 
International Court of Justice are cast as “self-styled” experts. See, e.g., id. at 1764, 1786, 
1792, 1806. 
9.  See infra Part I. 
10.  See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1822. 
11.  Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1766. But see Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, 
Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1268 (2002) (suggesting 
the opposite conclusion as Paulsen with regard to the reconciliation of the enumerated 
powers of Congress and the President). 
12.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
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forces . . . .”13 Moreover, where the essay does offer authority for its arguments, 
the most common source is Professor Paulsen’s own—famously idiosyncratic—
prior work.14 Where the analysis of others is cited, finally, it is subject to a strict 
litmus test: agreement with the view Professor Paulsen seeks to advance.15 
Reading the piece, thus, one might be forgiven for thinking that scholars are in 
agreement that customary international law is not federal law and that the 
President can disregard “unconstitutional” decisions of the Supreme Court.16 
All of this, of course, is misleading to the reader. It is the implications for 
Professor Paulsen’s own analysis, however, that concern me here. Ultimately, 
he gets things dramatically wrong, offering conclusions that simply cannot 
stand the light of day. Why? At least in part, I believe, it is because his 
arguments go untested against the views of those who might disagree.17 
Even more damning than its omissions of relevant authority, however, are 
the essay’s errors of commission, particularly in its treatment of Supreme 
Court precedent. Where the Court agrees with Professor Paulsen, its decisions 
are meticulously reviewed, in the spirit of not merely dispositive, but 
compelling, authority. No mention is made of close votes, limited holdings, or 
controversy. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon18 was thus “forthright” and “unabashed” 
in its holding.19 Medellín v. Texas20 was “rightly” decided.21 By contrast, 
decisions that cut against Paulsen’s claims—most of them, it turns out—are 
given the back of the hand. They are “highly controversial,”22 “deeply and 
bitterly divided,”23 wrongly decided,24 issued only because the Supreme Court 
 
13.  Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1833. 
14.  See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 n.10 (2001) (citing Paulsen as the only academic author to endorse 
strong-form departmentalism). References to his own work, it turns out, outnumber even 
citations to the Constitution. 
15.  See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1787 n.56, 1802 n.107, 1835 n.198. No effort is made, thus, 
to engage the contrary analysis and arguments offered by international law scholars, or even 
to distinguish their work. 
16.  But see, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American 
Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 91, 97-98 (2004); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 43, 47 (2004); Kramer, supra note 14, at 7. 
17.  See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1787 n.56, 1802 n.107, 1835 n.198. 
18.  548 U.S. 331 (2006). 
19.  Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1796. 
20.  129 S. Ct. 360 (2008). 
21.  See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1796. 
22.  Id. at 1834 (describing the decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)). 
23.  Id. at 1835 (describing the decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)); see also 
id. at 1790 (highlighting that American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003), 
was “decided by a narrow 5-4 majority”); id. at 1827 n.171 (“The decision [in Hamdan v. 
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had no other choice,25 or—in the most memorable case—best ignored, “so as to 
save the Court from the embarrassment of contradicting the  
Constitution . . . .”26 
I do not mean to suggest that legal scholars should limit themselves to a 
doctrinal approach to the Court, in which the Constitution, international law, 
and law generally are simply what the Court says they are. But as scholars 
trying to find, rather than promote, answers, we do well to be careful in our 
picking and choosing. A close vote is a close vote, whether it is for me or 
against me. Likewise, a binding decision is final regardless of whether it 
supports or contradicts my proposition. If Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon27 and 
Medellín v. Texas28 tell us something important about the subject at hand, then 
so do The Paquete Habana,29 Charming Betsy,30 Dames & Moore,31 Garamendi,32 
Hamdan,33 Boumediene,34 and other decisions, all of which Professor Paulsen is 
 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)] was five-to-three; the dissent was vigorous on this and 
other points.”). Reading Professor Paulsen’s account of the divided decisions in Sanchez-
Llamas and Medellín, on the other hand, one might have thought they were unanimous. See 
id. at 1796 (describing Sanchez-Llamas as “forthright” and “unabashed” in its holding, and 
Medellín as “rightly” decided).  
24.  This apparently includes the complete line of War on Terror cases, which were of lower 
quality, Paulsen suggests, than the so-called “ torture memos,” see Paulsen, supra note 1, at 
1826, as well as the Court’s entire political question jurisprudence, id. at 1784 n.53, 1817-18, 
its decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), see Paulsen, supra note 1, at 
1809 n.123, and the “manifestly unsound” and “thoroughly unpersuasive” decision in Dames 
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1789. 
25.  See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1790 (suggesting that for Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 
654 (1981), the “precedential weight is, perhaps, limited by the seeming necessity that the 
Court reach the result it did”). 
26.  Id. at 1802-03 (dismissing the Court’s longstanding decisions in The Paquete Habana, 175 
U.S. 677 (1900), and Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804)). 
Paulsen’s critique of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), might well be read to 
exemplify such prudential disregard of otherwise relevant Supreme Court precedent. 
Professor Paulsen thus seeks to emphasize the limited holding in Hamdan with the 
suggestion that it would be “a different matter” if Congress had itself authorized military 
commissions. And this, he tells us triumphantly, “is precisely what Congress (and President 
Bush) did, with the enactment of the MCA.” Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1835. What Professor 
Paulsen neglects to mention is that the Supreme Court apparently does not agree with him 
that this was “a different matter”—  at least if its subsequent decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), is to be believed. 
27.  548 U.S. 331 (2006). 
28.  129 S. Ct. 360 (2008). 
29.  175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
30.  6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
31.  453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
32.  539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
33.  548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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too quick—and determined—to dismiss. One cannot claim to offer a positive 
account of constitutional practice, ultimately, if one insists on ignoring actual 
constitutional practice. 
i i .  the nature of constraint:  legal and political 
Rather than a minor quibble with Professor Paulsen’s style, his misuse of 
authority deserves emphasis, given the pair of misunderstandings of the nature 
of law that arise from it. The first of these—as described at the outset—is his 
notion that law is not law, but policy, where it can be undone. Seemingly 
binding international law norms are not law, Professor Paulsen seems to 
believe, because they can be displaced by subsequent decisions of Congress, the 
President, and the courts.35 But can this possibly be true? 
Surely not, since the very same can be said of most domestic law as well.36 
Congress can displace prior legislation, as well as executive orders, agency 
regulations, and even some decisions of the Supreme Court.37 The President—
especially one empowered along the lines Professor Paulsen would favor38—can 
displace prior executive orders, some agency regulations, and perhaps much 
more. The Supreme Court can invalidate any of the above.39 And if we embrace 
Professor Paulsen’s strong-form departmentalism, Congress and the President 
can thereafter choose to ignore the offending decision of the Court.40 By 
 
34.  128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
35.  See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1786-88. 
36.  As Professors Goldsmith and Levinson have recently suggested, one might even see 
international law and constitutional law to have relatively more in common than do 
constitutional law and the rest of domestic law. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law 
for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1794 
(2009). 
37.  See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court As a 
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 289-91 (1957) (identifying the practice of 
congressional reversal of Supreme Court decisions). 
38.  See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1257, 1258 (2004) [hereinafter Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity] (reading the 
Presidential Oath Clause to create a “duty to preserve the constitutional order of the United 
States,” which has “priority over . . . specific provisions of the constitutional document”); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What the 
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221, 223 (1994) [hereinafter Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch] 
(suggesting that the executive branch has independent authority “to say what the law is,” 
and consequently “has the last word on most controversies”).  
39.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
40.  See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1817; see also Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, 
supra note 38, at 219 (describing strong-form departmentalism in definition of executive 
power).  
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Professor Paulsen’s measure, then, the U.S. domestic legal system turns out to 
be quite lawless.41 
But we are not lawless. Professor Paulsen, instead, misunderstands what 
law is. Or, in his own terms, what makes something a “political” versus “legal” 
constraint.42 He is at least partially right, of course, to suggest that the 
international law obligations of the United States can be displaced by 
subsequent domestic legislation.43 But a constraint does not cease to be so 
simply because it can be undone. In the first order, this is true as a conceptual 
matter. That “I can repeal the law” does not mean that “it fails to bind me even 
when I have not yet repealed it. Hobbes is wrong that, if you can free yourself 
at will, then you are already free . . .”44 It is no less true as a practical matter. 
The constraints of international law cannot be undone at will. Rather, to undo 
an obligation under international law—like one under domestic law—some 
threshold standard must be met and some prescribed process followed.45 By 
contrast with mere policy, it cannot be undone by fiat. As law, it can only be 
undone by law. 
No claim of exclusivity or equivalence need follow. Certain “laws” may 
enjoy a political force equal to their legal force. The nature of their constraint, as 
such, may be both political and legal. The political implications of the repeal of 
domestic law, meanwhile, may well be greater—even far greater—than any 
rejection of international law. Yet this is not less true across divergent domestic 
settings: amendments to the U.S. Constitution are subject to far more 
stringent political oversight than are zoning variances in the City of New 
Haven. Both zoning rules and the Constitution remain legal constraints, 
however, no less than international law. 
 
41.  At the extreme, if Paulsen were correct, the notion of state law would be almost entirely a 
non-sequitur, given the still-expansive scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority. See 
Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 125 n.61 
(2008) (noting the persistent breadth of congressional power, even after United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)). 
42.  See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1770. 
43.  See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2189 (1999). 
44.  G.A. Cohen, Reason, Humanity, and the Moral Law, in CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD ET AL., 
THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 167, 170 (Onora O’Neill ed., 1996); see also Christine 
Korsgaard, Reply, in CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD ET AL., THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 219, 
234 (Onora O’Neill ed., 1996) (noting the need for even the sovereign to change his or her 
mind in order to change the law, and inability to change one’s mind without a reason). 
45.  These standards and processes are what Paulsen himself outlines, in successively describing 
the Constitution’s provision for congressional, presidential, and judicial displacement of 
international law. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1776-85, 1816-22. 
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i i i .  there can be only one 
That international law—like most law—can be displaced by subsequent 
domestic initiative, then, does not make it policy rather than law. Professor 
Paulsen’s assertion to the contrary, however, turns out to be even more 
problematic than the foregoing suggests. For even if we assume, arguendo, 
that international law is not law in any domestic sense, it would still be law. 
Here we find the essay’s second misconception of the nature of law. This 
begins with Professor Paulsen’s embrace of an Austinian notion of law as 
limited to the coercive commands of a singular sovereign. Further, in Professor 
Paulsen’s account, a rule cannot be law for the United States, unless it is law of 
the United States. As above, however, these conclusions do not survive close 
scrutiny. 
International law constitutes its own system of rules and processes, to 
which the United States may be obliged and held liable. Consider the case of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), which Professor Paulsen assiduously 
avoids.46 The WTO is founded on a highly detailed set of rules, to which the 
United States has committed itself. Further, it offers a mechanism by which 
adherence to those rules can be tested, including trial-level proceedings and 
subsequent appellate review. At the end of this process, potentially costly 
sanctions can be—and have been—imposed on parties found to be out of 
compliance, including the United States. 
Professor Paulsen would have us regard these sanctions as “illusory,” as 
mere “policy and politics.”47 But why? At least in part, one might surmise, 
because of the lack of a WTO infantry charged to implement its sanctions. 
Such narrowly positivist accounts of the nature of law have largely been 
abandoned, however, even in domestic settings.48 Law, we now understand, 
consists of far more than what the army will enforce.49 
Overlooking all this, Professor Paulsen insists that “[t]he question of 
international law compliance is one of international politics and international 
 
46.  See DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 13-16 (2d ed. 2004); cf. John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding—Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 
60, 62-64 (1997) (describing the binding nature of WTO commitments). 
47.  See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1842. 
48.  Cf. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the “Rule of 
Law,” 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2287 (2003) (noting the irony in the critique of international 
law as “a matter of social norms, not law,” in light of the growing appreciation of the power 
of social norms in domestic settings). 
49.  See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 36, at 1822-23. 
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relations, not one of binding U.S. law.”50 But this misses the obvious middle 
ground. Even if international law were not binding U.S. law, neither would it 
be “international politics and international relations” alone. Rather, it would be 
international law.51 
Professor Paulsen’s error, however, goes beyond a sub rosa attempt to 
resuscitate the long-moribund claim that international law is not law, for lack 
of coercive force behind it.52 He might be right to cast international law as mere 
policy for the United States, if the Constitution could be read to assert a claim 
of exclusivity in its statement of “what the law is.”53 Professor Paulsen, in fact, 
might be understood to endorse just this view: 
While international law may prescribe that some exercises of the 
decision of the United States to engage in war are unlawful within the 
regime of international law, such restrictions may not interfere with 
Congress’s (and the President’s) constitutional powers. They are, in 
U.S. domestic constitutional law terms, unconstitutional purported 
restrictions on U.S. actors.54 
This reading, however, erroneously equates a lack of constitutional 
provision for some constraint with that constraint being unconstitutional. That 
 
50.  Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1823. At various points, Professor Paulsen seems to recognize— if 
only fleetingly— the status of international law as a distinct system of law. See, e.g., id. at 
1774, 1801. Generally speaking, in fact, much of the difficulty with Professor Paulsen’s essay 
lies in its ambiguous— and often inconsistent— use of terms. Compare id. at 1774 (identifying 
treaties that Paulsen considers to be “part of supreme federal law”), with id. at 1775-76 
(declaring that a treaty obligation “is of essentially no consequence” in terms of limiting the 
scope of military actions). 
51.  Professor Paulsen’s resistance to the possibility of multiple sources of law also places him in 
conflict with a growing body of work, in both domestic and transnational settings, that 
recognizes the reality— and perhaps even the inevitability—  of pluralism in the sources of 
law. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of 
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2095-96 (2004); Paul Schiff Berman, Global 
Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1230-31 (2007). 
52.  This debate has long been resolved in international law’s favor. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, 
THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 25-26 (2002); Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 36, at 
1822-23; Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 
2599, 2608-24 (1997). 
53.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). One might think of such a reading 
of the Constitution as embracing a kind of “field preemption,” see Caleb Nelson, 
Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 227 (2000), in which the very mention of an issue by the 
Constitution precludes other legal authority from speaking to it. 
54.  Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1823 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1770 (stating that 
international law “cannot be binding law except to the extent provided in the U.S. 
Constitution”); id. at 1771 (suggesting the potentially “unconstitutional” character of 
international law); cf. id. at 1775 n.33 (positing constitutional limitations on the scope of the 
Treaty Clause). 
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the Constitution allows Congress or the President to do something thus need 
not be understood as preventing some other regime from precluding that very 
conduct.55 And similarly, that the Constitution states that the President enjoys 
certain powers and is precluded from doing certain things is not the same thing 
as a statement that he or she must do those things or may do anything else he 
or she chooses. If it were, then nothing else—international law included—
could limit the President’s powers. Or more precisely, no government official 
could—consistent with his or her constitutional obligations—embrace such a 
limitation. The Constitution, however, does not state anything of the sort. 
Congress constrains presidential power all the time, in ways that go well 
beyond the text of Article II.56 Justice Jackson’s tripartite scheme in his 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer concurrence might even be read to 
endorse as much, with its recognition that presidential authority expands and 
contracts in ways beyond the bare outline of executive power offered in Article 
II, as Congress variously acts and fails to act.57 Broadly, one might plausibly see 
the contrast between the “formidable list of enumerated powers under Article 
I” and the “very general language” of executive power in Article II58 to suggest 
a reading of the latter as something less than a complete and exclusive 
statement of the parameters of presidential power.59 
I do not, to be clear, mean to suggest that the Constitution can never be 
understood to offer an exclusive statement of applicable law. The maxim of 
 
55.  To appreciate as much, consider Professor Paulsen’s blunt claim that “a treaty may not 
declare war in Congress’s stead or bar Congress from declaring war.” Paulsen, supra note 1, 
at 1775 n.33 (emphasis added). Even here, the assertion of constitutional exclusivity turns 
out to be tenuous. Of more than one hundred occasions for armed conflicts since the 
founding of the United States, Congress has only declared war as to five. See JOHN YOO, 
THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 
12 (2005). As a matter of constitutional practice, then, the Constitution’s provision for 
congressional authorization has not functioned as an exclusive statement of the means by 
which the United States may go to war. 
56.  Cf. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1767 (noting the potential for legislative powers to limit 
executive power). The War Powers Act might be cited as a fairly extreme example. See War 
Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2006). Professor Paulsen might object that 
such limits are themselves unconstitutional constraints on presidential power. If that is the 
critical point, however, then he should acknowledge that his essay is—  as it often seems to 
be— about the separation of powers, rather than international law. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra 
note 1, at 1785-86, 1840. 
57.  343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
58.  Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595, 657 (2008). 
59.  The historical context of the Constitution’s drafting might also be seen to support such a 
reading, with a nonexclusive design most capable of minimizing potential conflict with the 
global powers in whose sights the United States remained at the time of its Founding. Cf. 
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Founders’ Foreign Affairs Constitution: Improvising Among 
Empires, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 209, 209-10 (2008) (linking constitutional design to 
geopolitical constraints on the United States at the time of its founding). 
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expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which teaches that the express mention of one 
or more things in a class excludes other things of that class, may support this 
result in some settings, as perhaps with the statement of necessary 
qualifications for service in Congress.60 Professor Paulsen fails to demonstrate, 
however, why this should be true as to the Constitution’s provision for 
Congress’s declaration of war and the President’s pursuit of it. Given the lack 
of any enumerated constitutional “qualifications” of those powers, in fact, one 
might plausibly favor just the opposite conclusion.61 
This is important, because it means that there is nothing to prevent the 
President and the Senate from agreeing to at least some international 
constraints on congressional or presidential power. Surely there is some limit 
to how far they might go down that path. Presumably, they could not agree to 
allow “faceless bureaucrats” in Geneva to dissolve the presidency at will. But 
such slippery-slope claims generate more heat than light. The question raised 
by Professor Paulsen’s essay is whether the President and the Senate may 
agree—as they did with the Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against 
Torture, and elsewhere—to limit the conduct of the President in his or her 
pursuit of congressionally authorized war.62 That the Constitution itself does 
not itself impose such limits, I would argue, does nothing to suggest that the 
political branches are constitutionally disabled from advancing the national 
interest in that way.63 
conclusion 
Professor Paulsen’s claim is not, to be clear, that international law functions 
differently—or enjoys some lesser stature—than domestic law. Nor does he 
simply suggest that international law stands on less stable political ground and 
is hence more susceptible to repeal. Each of these propositions might warrant 
 
60.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
61.  Ultimately, such an analysis would necessarily depend on the nature of both the operative 
constitutional provision—  its level of detail, demarcation of relevant limits, and the like— and 
the relevant international constraint. 
62.  See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment art. 2, § 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85 (entered into force June 26, 1987); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
63.  In the final analysis, the issue at hand might be seen as a question of what constitutes a 
conflict between the Constitution and international law. Professor Paulsen emphasizes that 
where there is a conflict, the Constitution must prevail. See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1765, 
1772. Few are likely to disagree. The critical question is when there is— and when there is 
not—  a conflict. 
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support—even among the “clique” of international law scholars.64 The insight 
that Professor Paulsen hopes to advance, however, is rather more extreme. 
International law does not mean less than domestic law; at least as law, it 
means nothing. No authority beyond his own certainty in this proposition, 
however—be it the Constitution, Supreme Court precedent, congressional 
legislation, or executive decree—can get him there. As Professor Paulsen points 
out, there is a fog—but it is not in international law. 
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64.  See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1764. 
